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The following article is an
edited version of the amicus

curiae brief filed with the
Supreme Court of the United
States in the October Term,
1998, in the case of Benjamin

Lee Lilly v. Commonwealth of
Virginia (No. 98-5881).
"This case raises important
questions about the meaning of
the confrontation clause, which
has been a vital ingredient of
the fair trial right for hundreds
of years," Professor Richard
Friedman and his co-authors
say. "In particular, this case
presents the Court with an
opportunity to reconsider the
relationship between the
confrontation clause and the
law of hearsay." On June 10 the
Court handed down a decision
in favor of Lilly. Justice Stephen
Breyer, a member of the
plurality, wrote a concurring
opinion citing this brief
favorably and suggested that a
future case might call for the
Court to adopt its approach.
(See story on page 53.)

The petitioner, Benjamin Lilly, was
convicted in the Virginia Circuit Court of
the capital murder of a student during a
carjacking. The trial court entered
judgment on the jurys verdict on March 7,
1997, and imposed the death sentence
recommended by the jury: The Virginia
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and
the sentence on April 17, 1998, in Lilly v.
Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522 (VA 1998).
With petitioner at the time of the
shooting were Gary Wayne Barker and
petitioners brother, Mark lilly: At the
petitioners trial, Barker, who had been
allowed to plead guilty and to avoid the
death penalty, testified against him; Mark
lilly, who had not been tried or allowed to
plead, invoked his privilege against selfincrimination. The court then admitted the
in-custody confession given by Mark lilly
to the police in which he named his
brother as the triggerman. Mark lilly was
subsequently permitted to plead guilty to
noncapital murder, and recanted portions
of his confession at petitioners sentencing.
On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court
held that Mark lillys in-custody confession
had been properly admitted as a statement
against interest under a "firmly rooted"
Virginia hearsay exception, and that the
confession therefore satisfied the
confrontation clause.
This case presents the Court with an
opportunity to restore the confrontation
clause to its proper place as one of the
fundamental guarantees protected by the
Constitution, one with deep roots in the
Anglo-American tradition, and indeed,
throughout Western jurisprudence.
Decisions of this Court have tended to
merge the confrontation right with the
ordinary law of hearsay, perceiving both as
principally guarantors of the reliability of
evidence.
This approach, we submit, has not
worked. It denigrates the confrontation
right and the fundamental sense of
procedural fairness that the right protects.
It ignores the language of the clause, the
history of the right, and the role of the
right in the Sixth Amendment. It provides
insufficient guidance and affords too much
discretion to lower courts in interpreting
the confrontation clause. It simultaneously
leads to overly rigid hearsay law. The price
to our system of justice is exemplified by
intolerable results such as the one reached
by the court below in this case.
We believe that it is necessary to break
the link between confrontation and hearsay,
both so that a robust understanding of the
confrontation right can be developed and

so that ordinary hearsay law will not be
confused by an imposed correspondence
with a right that has been inadequately
articulated. A majority of this Court, in
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353 (1992),
rejected a proposal by the government to
uncouple the confrontation clause from the
hearsay rule as an "argument ... [that]
comes too late in the day," but that
conclusion was apparently based primarily
on the Courts concern that the
governments reading of 'the clause "would
virtually eliminate its role in restricting the
admission of hearsay testimony."
By contrast, the approach we present
here would reinvigorate the clause, giving
it force independent of hearsay law. At the
same time, though our approach is
markedly different analytically from the
current doctrine, the results of our
approach would, at least for the most
part, square with those reached in the
Courts decisions.
The most crucial step in achieving a
better sense of the confrontation clause is
recognizing its unique purpose. The Sixth
Amendment provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with witnesses
against him." The concerns that led to the
confrontation clause predate modern
hearsay law. Two consequences flow from
this acknowledgement. First, if a declarant
is acting as a witness - whether in or out
of court - the clause undeniably applies
and violations of its core principles cannot
be excused on the basis of hearsay
exceptions. Second, not every hearsay
declaration raises a confrontation clause
issue. Within its proper realm, we believe
the confrontation clause states a simple and
categorical rule, which is central to the
Anglo-American concept of justice: the
accused has a right to confront all adverse
witnesses. This means, at the very least,
the right to cross-examine the witness
under oath.
We will present in this brief some
varying understandings of what the term
"witnesses" should be understood to mean
in the clause. Formulating a precise
definition is not a simple matter, but under
any plausible definition, Mark lilly was
acting as a witness within the meaning of
the clause when he made the crucial
accusation in this case. The admission of
such statements sets up, in effect, an
inquisitorial system in which prosecutors
are free to take unsworn statements from

LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES FALL/WINTER

1999 91

witnesses behind closed doors, out of the
presence of the accused or of counsel, who
are given no opportunity for crossexaminaton, and then use those statements
to convict a defendant - all because of the
courts' perception that such testimony is
trustworthy. This practice was recognized
to be unacceptable long before the
confrontation clause was adopted. And it is
at the very core of what the clause was
meant to prevent. Just as the rights to trial
by jury and to counsel are not qualified by
the court's evaluation of the merits of the
case, the right to confront the witness is
not qualified by the court's evaluation of
the accuracy of the witness' statement.

The argument

... if a person acts as a witness
against an accused, the accused
must have an opportunity to
confront that person.
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Anglo-American traditions, civilized
practice, and the structure of the Sixth
Amendment call for a categorical right to
confrontation independent of the hearsay
doctrine. The right of an accused to
confront the witnesses against him
predates, and is independent of, the law of
hearsay. It has received its fullest
development within the Anglo-American
tradition, but it has also been a critical
feature of other judicial systems, which
have nothing resembling our law of
hearsay. The history and broad recognition
of the confrontation right demonstrate that
it is not an adjunct of, or an attempt to
constitutionalize, the law of hearsay. Rather,
it is a fundamental and categorical rule as
to how the testimony of witnesses should
be taken.
The right to confrontation has a long
history that antedates the hearsay rule . The
ancient Hebrews required accusing
witnesses to give their testimony in front of
the accused . So did the Romans. When
medieval continental systems began to rely
on the testimony of witnesses, they allowed
the parties to examine the witnesses - but
on written questions. These systems took
the testimony behind closed doors, for fear
that witnesses would be coached or
intimidated.
By contrast, the open and
confrontational way in which testimony
was taken was the most critical
characteristic of the common law trial. In
the middle of the 16th century, Sir Thomas
Smith wrote a well-known account of a
typical English criminal trial, which he

described as an "altercation" between the
accusing witness and the accused.
Beginning nearly a century before Smith
wrote, and continuing for centuries
afterwards, numerous English judges and
commentators praised the open and
confrontational nature of the English trial
in contrast to its continental counterpart.
For example, Sir Matthew Hale lauded
the "open Course of Evidence to the Jury
in the Presence of the Judges, Jury, Parties
and Council" in English procedure. Among
other advantages, this procedure allowed
"Opportunity for all Persons concem'd" to
question the witness and "Opportunity of
confronting the adverse Witnesses." In a
passage closely following Hale, Blackstone
articulated many of the same advantages including "the confronting of adverse
witnesses" - of "the English way of giving
testimony, ore tenus."
Thus, by 1696, in the celebrated case of
R. v. Paine, it was clearly established that,
even if a witness had died, his statement
made to a justice of the peace could not be
admitted against a misdemeanor defendant
because the defendant was not present
when the examination was taken and so
"could not cross-examine" the deponent.
To be sure, the norm of confrontation
was not always respected. First, Paine itself
distinguished felony cases. Since the mid16th century, justices of the peace had
been required to examine felony witnesses,
and these examinations were admissible at
trial if the witness was then unavailable
and the examination was taken under oath.
This anomalously lenient treatment which was probably one of the abuses at
which the confrontation clause was aimed
- was controversial by the early 17th
century, and it was eliminated by statute in
the 19th century.
Second, a set of courts in England,
including the equity courts, followed the
continental system rather than the
common law, relying largely on testimony
taken out of court and out of the presence
of the parties. These courts appeared to be
arms of unlimited royal power, and so
many of them, notably the court of Star
Chamber, did not survive the upheavals of
the 17th century.
Third, the crown, eager to use the
criminal law as a means of controlling its
adversaries, sometimes used testimony

taken out of the presence of the accused.
Thus, it is in the treason cases of Tudor and
Stuart England that we find the battle for
the confrontation right most clearly fought.
As early as 1521, treason defendants,
often using the term "face to face,"
demanded that the witnesses be brought
before them. Sometimes these demands
were heeded, sometimes not - but what is
most notable is that they found recurrent
support in acts of Parliament, which
repeatedly required that accusing witnesses
be brought "face to face" with the
defendant. By the middle of the 17th
century, the battle was won, and courts
clearly understood that treason witnesses
must testify before the accused , subject to
questions by the accused.
Well into that century, prosecutorial
authorities often tried to use confessions of
alleged accomplices of the accused that
were not made according to the usual
norms of testimony, under oath and before
the accused. The case of Sir Walter Raleigh
is the most notorious, but far from the only
one. The theory ~ remarkably similar to
the one adopted by the lower court in this
case - was that self-accusation was "as
strong as if upon oath." But the judges
soon realized the iniquity of allowing an
exception to the usual norms of testimony
simply because the accomplice accused
himself as well as another.
In 1662, shortly after the Restoration ,
the judges of the Kings Bench ruled
unanimously and definitively that, though
a pretrial confession was "evidence against
the Party himself who made the
Confession" and, if adequately proved,
could indeed support conviction of that
person without witnesses to the reason
itself, the confession "cannot be used as
evidence against any others whom on his
Examination he confessed to be in the
Treason." This fundamental principle seems
never since to have been seriously
challenged until recently - in cases like
the current one.
The confrontation right naturally found
its way to America. Thus, a Massachusetts
statute of 164 7 provided that "in all capital
cases all witnesses shall be present
wheresoever they dwell." But the
Americans did not simply draw on English
law. American criminal procedure
developed in a distinctive way The right to
counsel in felony trials developed far more
quickly in America than in England, and
with it rose an adversarial spirit that made
the opportunity for confrontation of
adverse witnesses especially crucial. In

addition, the right became especially
relevant to American concerns when
Parliament began in the 1760s to regulate
the colonists through inquisitorial means
like the Stamp Act, which provided for the
examination of witnesses upon
interrogatories. It is clear that the framers
were aware of the abuses in the 16th and
17th century treason trials of the
defendants' demands for meeting their
accusers "face to face." They knew as well
about the procedural reforms achieved by
the Glorious Revolution, which included
requiring treason to be proved through the
testimony of two trial witnesses.
In the Revolutionary period, the right to
confrontation was frequently expressed,
especially in the early state constitutions.
Some used the time-honored "face to face"
phrase; others, following Hale and
Blackstone, adopted language strikingly
similar to that later used in the
confrontation clause of the Sixth
Amendment.
Note that in this account of the
background of the Confrontation Clause,
we have not mentioned reliability. To be
sure, one of the advantages perceived by
those who lauded the common law system
of open confrontation of witnesses was its
contribution to truth-determination. But
neither in the statutes, nor in the case law,
nor in the commentary was there a
suggestion that, if the courts determined
that a particular item or type of testimony
was reliable, then the accused lost his right
of confrontation. On the contrary, the
confrontation principle was a categorical
rule, a basic matter of the procedures by
which testimony was taken.
Similarly, the law against hearsay has
not played a role in this account. It could
not have: Hearsay doctrine, like evidentiary
law more generally, was not well developed
even at the time the clause was adopted,
much less during the previous centuries.
As late as 1794, Edmund Burke remarked
in the House of Commons that the rules of
"the law of evidence ... [were] very
general, very abstract, and comprised in so
small a compass that a parrot he had
known might get them by rote in one half

hour, and repeat them in five minutes."
The tendency to meld the confrontation
right and hearsay is a latter-day
development. It likely reflects the influence
of Wigmore, who subordinated the
confrontation right to hearsay More recent
commentators regard Wigmore's view as
anachronistic because their research
teaches that the hearsay rule evolved in
both England and America considerably
later than Wigmore argued.
It is noteworthy that the word hearsay
appears neither in Mattox v. United States
156 U.S. 237 (1895), the first of several
cases to note that the "primary object" of
the clause was to prevent the use of
testimony taken ex parte, nor in Pointer v.
Texas 380 U.S. 400 (1965), which held
that the clause expresses a fundamental
right applicable against the states. As its
language plainly indicates, the clause was
not an attempt to constitutionalize the
nascent law of hearsay Rather, it plainly
expressed the fundamental principle that if
a person acts as a witness against an
accused, the accused must have an
opportunity to confront that person.
Our historical discussion has shown
that evidentiary concerns were not a
significant factor in adoption of the
confrontation clause. Rather, the clause was
meant to protect a categorical procedural
right that, like the right to counsel, was in
place by the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted. The conclusion is fortified by the
placement of the clause in the Sixth
Amendment.
If one looks at the grand design of the
Sixth Amendment, in accordance with
ordinary canons of statutory analysis that
construe a provision as a harmonious
whole, one sees a bundle of procedural
protections for a criminal defendant that
have more than accuracy in factfinding at
their core. The right to counsel is
recognized as fundamental even if it
interferes with factfinding in a particular
case. And the right to a jury trial is not
suspended because a judge may be more
capable than jurors of correctly evaluating
complicated expert testimony, such as
competing statistical analyses of the
significance of DNA evidence. Nor has the
interpretation of the Compulsory Process
Clause turned solely on "accuracy in
factfinding."
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Only the Confrontation Clause has of
late been stripped of any role other than
furthering evidentiary objectives. We urge
the Court to recognize that this
interpretation ignores significant values at
the core of the right to confrontation, and
leads to intolerable results that cannot be
adequately policed by the Court.
This perspective is borne out by recent
developments under the European
Convention on Human Rights. This
convention contains nothing resembling a
hearsay rule, of course, because most of the
judicial systems falling under it do not
have hearsay law. But Articles 6(1) and
6(3)(d) of the convention contain,
respectively, a general protection of a
criminal defendants right to a fair trial and
a specific protection of his right "to
examine or have examined witnesses
against him." Under these provisions, the
European Court of Human Rights has
issued a series of decisions establishing a
right of confrontation, which it has referred
to as such.
Thus, the Court has repeatedly held that
defendants' confrontation rights were
violated by the use at trial of statements
made before trial to investigative or
prosecutorial authorities, where the
defendant had no opportunity to examine
the witness. And the English Court of
Appeal has recently relied on the same
provisions of the convention in reaching a
similar conclusion.
We thus face the great irony that the
confrontation right, one of the great glories
of the Anglo-American system of criminal
procedure, is now receiving its clearest
articulation in decisions by and following a
continental court. The reasons are clear
enough: The Europeans are unencumbered
by the peculiar hearsay doctrine of the
common law tradition. They recognize that
confrontation is a categorical rule that
expresses a fundamental human right.
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Insearch
of more constant results
A categorical right of confrontation
would yield more constant results,
eliminate the courts' need to evaluate
trustworthiness in applying the Sixth
Amendment, and permit the continuing
development of the hearsay rule without
requiring the overruling of prior precedents
of the Court. The Courts current approach
to confrontation produces intolerable
results, as illustrated by the case below.
The court has declared an exact fit
between the hearsay rule and the
confrontation clause when the out-of-court
statement satisfies a "firmly rooted" hearsay
exception. (The court has said that "a
'firmly rooted' hearsay exception is so
trustworthy that adversarial testing can be
expected to add little to its reliability")
This formula, which masquerades as a
categorical rule that results in consistent
interpretations of a basic constitutional
right, instead gives lower courts enormous
leeway to admit hearsay against a criminal
defendant, subject to correction only in the
rare instance in which this Court grants
certiorari.
The test to be used in determining
when an exception is "firmly rooted" is far
from clear. In White (502 U.S. at 357),
the Court affirmed the Illinois courts
admission of statements made in the course
of receiving medical care that identified the
defendant as having sexually abused a fouryear-old child. The Court justified its
conclusion that such statements are "firmly
rooted" by noting that a hearsay exception
for such statements is recognized in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and is "widely
accepted among the states." But before the
Federal Rules' enactment in 1975, the
exception generally did not include
statements such as the one involved in
White, describing an injury's cause, even if
relevant to diagnosis or treatment.
Moreover, numerous post-White courts
have admitted statements under cover of
the exception and over confrontation
clause objections even though the
trustworthiness rationale of the exception
was not satisfied because the declarant was
too young to appreciate that "the efficacy of
her medical treatment depends upon the
accuracy of the information provided to
the doctor."

On the other hand, in Lee v. Illinois, 476
U.S. 530 (1986), this Court held that the
Illinois courts had erred in admitting an
accomplices confession against his
codefendant. The majority rejected the
states "characterization of the hearsay
involved ... as a simple 'declaration
against penal interest,"' explaining that
"[t]hat concept defines too large a class for
meaningful confrontation clause analysis."
Consequently, the confession was not
automatically admisstble as "firmly rooted,"
even through the Federal Rules, and
numerous state codifications, had
expanded the hearsay exception for
declarations against interest to encompass
statements against penal interest.
Viewed together, White and Lee lead to
circular reasoning. White indicates that
when a state proffers a statement that fits
within an exception that is "firmly rooted"
- i.e., widely accepted by the states for
some time, and present in the Federal
Rules - trustworthiness can be inferred.
Thus, the need for confrontation
disappears - even if the exception was
extended by the rules themselves beyond
prior law and even if the particular
application is poorly grounded in the
rationale of the exception. Lee says that an
inherently untrustworthy statement cannot
be automatically admitted as "firmly
rooted" even if the exception under which
it is offered has been generally accepted for
a while, and is incorporated in the Federal
Rules. Taken together, these cases beg the
question of how a court should respond
when reviewing evidence proffered under a
refashioned traditional class exception, or a
nontraditional class exception, that has
been accepted for some period of time in
its jurisdiction and others.
The default test of "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness," which
applies when an exception is not firmly
rooted, also fails to offer sufficient guidance
or to protect a defendant adequately, as this
case illustrates. Nothing in the actual
holding of Lee bars a court from admitting
an accomplices confession, such as the
statement in this case, if it concludes that
the particular confession is sufficiently
reliable. So long as the Court retains its
trusworthiness view of confrontation, and
does not abandon Lee in favor of a per se
rule that certain kinds of confessions never

satisfy the confrontation clause, courts will
continue to have enormous, virtually
unreviewable, discretion in determining
trustworthiness on a case-by-case basis.
The facts of this case demonstrate the
amorphous nature of a trusworthiness
inquiry True, Mark Lilly admitted to
participation in a series of crimes. But the
"totality of circumstances that surround the
making of the statement" (see Idaho v.
Wright, 497 U.S. 805,820 [1990]), raises
numerous factors - which we assume
petitioner will present to this Court - that
might plausibly account for Mark Lilly
falsely incriminating his brother.
It cannot be fair to deprive a defendant
of the ancient right to face his accuser
because a judge mixes some dubious
generalizations about human behavior such as that one is unlikely to make a
statement confessing a crime unless the
entirety of the statement is substantially
true, or that brothers would not falsely
incriminate each other - with his own
view of the surrounding facts to conclude
that the statement is probably true. Hearsay
exceptions may hinge on such cliches, but
a defendant should have the right to
challenge his accuser in the courtroom
when the out-of-court statement falls
within the perimeter of core values on
which the Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation rests.

Law of confrontation

independent of the
law of he
y
Neither the "firmly rooted" test nor the
requirement of "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness" provides a satisfactory
test of confrontation that guides the lower
courts or ensures that a defendant is
accorded the procedural protections
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
A categorical approach would exclude
in-custody confessions unless the
defendant was afforded his right of
confrontation. Our arguments indicate that
the constitutional right of confrontation is
independent of, and should not be made
subordinate to, the ordinary law of hearsay.
We contend that applicability of the
confrontation clause to an out-of-court

statement does not depend on a courts
assessment of the statement's reliability
Rather, the clause states a fundamental
procedural protection, and applies
categorically to certain types of statements.
In this section, we will present two
proposals for defining that category of
statements. While we urge the Court to
declare that such a categorical right exists,
we do not believe that to decide this case
the Court must choose one of these
variants, or any other particular proposal,
or that it must define the boundaries of the
clause with precision. Under any reasonable
demarcation of the category of statements
covered by the clause, accomplice
confessions like the one here of Mark Lilly
lie at the heart of the clause, and nowhere
near the edge.
A testimonial view. Under one approach,
the key question is this: In making the
statement at issue, should the declarant be
deemed to have been as a witness within
the meaning of the confrontation clause?
If not, then under this approach the clause
does not apply On the other hand, if the
declarant was acting as a witness, and the
accused has not had an adequate
opportunity to confront her, then the
statement may not be admitted against the
accused (unless he has forfeited the
confrontation right by causing the witness's
unavailability). See Akhil Reed Amar, The
Constitution and Criminal Procedure 125-31
(1997) and Richard D. Friedman,
"Confrontation: The Search for Basic
Principles," 86 Georgetown Law Journal
1011, 1022-26 (1998).
This view finds obvious support in the
language of the confrontation clause which speaks in unqualified terms of the
accused's right to confront "the witnesses
against" the accused. It is supported also by
the history of the clause and in its manifest
role in our system of criminal procedure.
As we have shown, the clause
constitutionalizes a long-established
procedural rule governing the manner by
which witnesses give testimony for
adjudication in the Anglo-American
system, a manner far different from the
inquisitorial style used by Continental
courts.
When, then, should a declarant be
deemed to have acted as a witness in
making a statement against an accused?

So long as the Court retains its
trusworthiness view of
confrontation, and does not
abandon Lee in favor of a per se
rule that certain kinds of
confessions never satisfy the
confrontation clause, courts will
continue to have enormous,
virtually unreviewable, discretion
in determining trustworthiness
on a case-by-case basis.
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Put another way, when is her statement
testimonial? Obviously, she acts as a
witness if she testified in court, at the trial
of the defendant; the defendant then has a
right to be present at the trial and crossexamine her. It is hardly less obvious that
the declarant is acting as a witness if she
gives the prosecution an affidavit, or
otherwise makes a formal pre-trial
statement under oath about the alleged
crime to the authorities. (Statements made
at a grand jury proceeding, therefore,
should not be usable at trial unless the
declarant testifies and is subject to crossexamination. This rule would eliminate the
current practice of subjecting grand jury
statements to a "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness" analysis when they are
offered under a residual hearsay exception.)
Indeed, it has often been said that ex parte
affidavits and other "formalized testimonial
materials" were the focus of the
confrontation clause.
Justices Scalia and Thomas explicitly
included "confessions" in the category of
"formalized testimonial materials." Thus ,
their analysis would - properly - bring
statements like Mark Lilly's in this case
within the ambit of the confrontation
clause. A better and less strained approach
to the same result, we suggest, is to
recognize that formality is not a
prerequisite to deeming a statement
testimonial, and so bringing it within that
ambit. Rather, formality is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for making
testimony acceptable. In particular, the oath
is perhaps the oldest and most nearly
universal requirement for the giving of
testimony If unsworn confessions to the
authorities were not deemed to be
statements within the protection of the
confrontation clause, then we would have
a system in which the authorities could
take statements for use at trial , made by
declarants knowing they would be so used
- testimony in any real sense of the word
- absent not only confrontation but also
the basic protection of the oath; indeed, the
authorities would have an incentive to take
the statement without the oath, simply so
that the confrontation clause could not be
invoked. Thus, it appears that statements
made knowingly, even informally, to the
authorities investigating a crime should be
considered testimonial and so within the
coverage of the confrontation clause.
In short, under the testimonial approach,
this is an easy case. Mark Lilly's custodial
confession lies at the core of the
confrontation case, not near its fringes.
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A prosecutorial restraint view. A
somewhat different focus rephrases the key
question to ask whether the government
participated in making the declarant a
witness against the defendant. This
approach views the confrontation clause as
integral to a central objective of the Bill of
Rights - to restrain the capricious use of
governmental power. The colonists were
well aware that the criminal law is a
powerful tool in controlling perceived
enemies of the state, and knew of the
potency and secrecy with which a
government can act. To counter these
dangers, out-of-court statements procured
by the prosecution or police, or their
agents, should stand on a different footing
than statements obtained without
governmental intrusion. Requiring
confrontation when the prosecution has
played a part in producing the evidence
enables the public to scrutinize the process
by which the government is exercising its
power, and complements the other rights
that the Sixth Amendment grants - trial
by jury, a public trial, specification of the
charges, and right to counsel.
Under this approach, confrontation
protects the defendant against statements
that the government might elicit through
its enormous power to coerce or induce. If
confrontation is not required, the
government has the huge advantage of
choosing whether to offer the contents of
the statement through the testimony of the
often discreditable declarant, or through
the testimony of a presumptively upright
person involved in law enforcement
(assuming a hearsay exception otherwise
applies).
There may be instances in which the
prosecutorial restraint model might yield a
different result than the testimonial
approach. But this is not such a case. Mark
Lilly's in-custody statement to the police
falls squarely within the ambit of the
confrontation right a prosecutorial restraint
approach would grant.
A categorical approach is consistent
with the results reached by the Court in its
prior decisions. Plainly, the approach to the
confrontation clause that we suggest and
the doctrine enunciated by the Court are
different analytically Our approach is,
however, consistent with all, or virtually
all, of the results reached by the Court.

Indeed, we believe that, though the Court
has not consciously articulated our
approach, its decisions have reflected the
force of that approach. We do not contend,
of course, that adoption of our approach
will answer all questions under the
confrontation clause or that it will
eliminate all difficult cases. But some cases
that have appeared troublesome to the
Court become very straightforward under
our approach.
First consider Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965), the case that first established
that the confrontation right is a
fundamental one incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment, its companion
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965),
and Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
These cases all had two features. First, in
each of these cases, the declaration at issue
was a statement knowingly made in a
judicial proceeding or to investigative
authorities, providing information material
to a criminal investigation. Thus, under
any variation of the approach we have
presented, the declarants must be deemed
to have been witnesses within the meaning
of the confrontation clause. Indeed, in both
Douglas and Lee, as in this case, the
declaration was the confession of an alleged
accomplice. Second, in these cases the
accused did not have an adequate
opportunity to confront the witness. Thus,
in each of these three cases the conclusion
is easy that the accused's confrontation
rights were violated - without any need
for anything like the dubious reliability
analysis of Lee.
By contrast, in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74 (1970), and United States v. Inadi, 475
U.S. 387 (1986), the first of these features
was not present, so statements appear not
to have been within the realm of the
confrontation clause as we have defined it.
In Dutton, the statement was made by one
prisoner to another. In Inadi, the statements
were made by one member of a conspiracy
to another, without any inducement by
agents of the prosecution; they were not
testifying but carrying on the ordinary
business of the conspiracy Thus, in neither
of these cases were the declarants acting as
witnesses when they made the statements
in issue. A similar argument has force with
respect to at least some of the statements
made by the four-year-old declarant such as those to her babysitter and to her
mother - in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346
(1992).

In other cases, the second aspect of the

Pointer-Douglas-Lee line has not been
present, because the accused was held to
have had an adequate opportunity to
confront the witness before trial. That was
so in Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237
(1895), one of the oldest confrontation
clause cases, in which the witness had
testified, subject to cross-examination, at
the accuseds first trial but died before his
second trial. And in California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149 (1970), the accused had an
opportunity at a preliminary hearing to
examine the witness, who appeared at trial
but was then uncooperative.
In Mattox, the prosecution could not
have produced the witness at the trial in
question, and in Green the prosecution did
produce him. In other cases, though the
accused had some previous opportunity to
examine the witness, he still raised a
confrontation clause argument that the
prosecution had not done what it could to
secure the live testimony of the witness at
the trial in question. In Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719 (1968), .the Court agreed that the
prosecution had failed to make a good faith
attempt to secure the attendance of the
witness at trial; in addition, it held that in
the circumstances the defendants prior
opportunity to examine the witness had
not been sufficient. Plainly, the holding of
Barber is not inconsistent with our
approach. Even assuming the defendant
has had a previous opportunity to confront
the witness, it is still preferable that the
witness testify live, and the prosecution
ought to make reasonable efforts to secure
his attendance. In Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408
U.S. 204 (1972), and Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56 (1980), the Court held that the
prosecutions efforts were satisfactory.
Again, nothing in these cases is
inconsistent with our approach: Given that
the accused had previously had an
adequate opportunity to examine the
witness, if the witness was unavailable at
trial despite good faith efforts, the
confrontation clause should not preclude
use of the earlier testimony.
Finally, we note Williamson v. United
States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994). A
straightforward result would have
recognized that admission of the statement
at issue, an accomplices confession to the
police, presumptively violated the
confrontation clause. Instead, the Court
issued a highly restrictive construction of
the hearsay exception for declarations
against penal interest, expressed in Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). The basis for

this decision is unfortunate. If extended to
declarations against interest in general and neither the Courts decision nor the
rule gives any basis for declining to do so
- it limits the usefulness of a much-used
exception across a broad range of cases,
civil as well as criminal; the interpretation
in Williamson was far more restrictive than
most prior authorities suggested.
Williamson is thus a good indication that
the melding of the confrontation clause
and of hearsay doctrine tends not only to
denigrate the constitutional protection, but
also to make hearsay law unduly rigid.
The Court will, we believe, continue to
make decisions that reflect the demands of
the confrontation right, because that right
is such a fundamental, and intuitively
appealing, aspect of civilized jurisprudence.
But if it continues to use hearsay law as the
vehicle for those decisions, it will be
unable to articulate either a robust
understanding of the constitutional right or
a sensible, truth-oriented, doctrine of
hearsay.

Conclusion
The Court could reach the proper result
in this case without revisiting its approach
to the confrontation clause. But to do so
would just be to put one more patch on a
tattered garment. It would leave lower
courts perplexed on how to apply the
clause, because there would still be no
constant guide to the Courts decisions. It
would continue to make effective appellate
review impractical, because decisions
would still depend so heavily on analysis of
the evidence in the particular case. It
would require continuing reliance on
hearsay doctrine to do the work that
should be performed by the confrontation
clause - to the detriment of both. It
would mean that the Courts stated
grounds of decision lack persuasive power.
And it would miss out on the great
principle underlying the clause, one
integral to the Sixth Amendment and with
roots both deep and broad: When the
government prosecutes an accused, the
accused has a categorical right to confront
"the witnesses against him."
The decision of the Virginia Supreme
Court should be reversed.

Professor Richard D. Friedman earned a
B.A. and a ].D. from Harvard and a D.Phil. in
modem history from Oxford University. His
research focuses principally on evidence and
Supreme Court history. He is the general editor
of The New Wigmore, a multi-volume treatise
on evidence, and has been designated to write
the volume on the Hughes Court in the Oliver
Wendell Holmes Devise, a history of the
United States Supreme Court. Professor
Friedman clerked for Judge Irving R. Kaufman
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. He was then an associate for the law
firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison in New York City. He came to the
I.aw School as a visiting professor in 1987 from
Cardozo I.aw School and joined the regular
faculty in 1988.

LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES FALL/WINTER

1999 97

